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Abstract
This paper explores the link between a firm’s non-cancellable operating lease
commitments and stock returns. Firms with more operating lease commitments
earn a significant premium over firms with fewer commitments, and this premium is
countercyclical. Non-cancellable operating lease payments represent a major
claim on a firm’s cash flows. Firms with high levels of operating leases have higher
cash flow sensitivity to aggregate shocks and hence higher operating leverage. The
relationship between operating leases and stock returns is stronger in small firms
than in big firms.
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1 Introduction
Operating leases are the most common and important source of off-balance sheet
financing, and operating lease use has increased substantially over the past several
decades.1 According to Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009); leasing is of comparable
The author is grateful to Selale Tuzel for many comments and discussions. Furthermore, I
would like to thank two anonymous referees and Kursat Aydogan, Cem Demiroglu, John
Doukas (the Editor), Huseyin Gulen, Dong Lu, Armin Schwienbacher, and seminar
participants at the 2014 PFMC Conference, the 2015 MFA conference, and Koc University
for their helpful suggestions. Parts of this paper were written when the author was visiting
the University of Southern California.
1Cornaggia et al. (2013) document that operating leases increased 745% as a proportion of
total debt from 1980 to 2007. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) debated whether operating and
capital leases should be combined and presented on the balance sheet (The Wall Street
Journal, March 18 2014). The boards agreed to recognize certain operating leases on the
balance sheet. However, they failed to reach a consensus on how to recognise expenses on the
lessee’s income statement.
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importance to long-term debt, and for small firms, leasing may be the largest source of
external financing.2 These authors report that ‘the proportion of capital that firms lease in
merged Census–Compustat data is 16%, which is similar to the long-term debt-to-assets
ratio of 19%’.
Operating lease payments represent a major claim on firms’ cash flows. Some of these
leases are short term; they may be reversible and provide flexibility to the firm compared
to ownership. However, some operating leases are non-cancellable during the lease term
except in the event of bankruptcy. During the business cycle, firms cannot easily cancel
or adjust the terms of this type of lease contract with their lessors. This inflexibility in
operating lease costs increases firm risk. Firms with relatively high levels of operating
lease commitment are more vulnerable to the business cycle than those with fewer
commitments. Consequently, shareholders require a higher rate of return for bearing this
risk, and expected stock returns of firms with higher levels of operating leases are greater
compared to those of firms with lower levels of operating leases.
In this paper, I show that a firm’s non-cancellable lease commitments are positively
and monotonically related to expected returns. I construct a measure of the firm’s
operating lease ratio by dividing minimum lease commitments by the firm’s total assets.
This ratio represents the level of non-cancellable operating lease use. The sample
includes US firms in the merged CRSP–Compustat database that report their lease
commitments. On average, firms with high lease ratios have higher expected stock
returns than firms with low lease ratios: a difference of 11.0% per annum for equal-
weighted portfolios and 4.7% per annum for value-weighted portfolios.
Firmswith high levels of operating leases are riskier, especially during recessions. The
return spread between high- and low-lease ratio firms is countercyclical and is about four
times as high during recessions as it is during expansions. To investigate the risk
mechanism behind expected returns, I show, first, that operating lease commitments have
very limited comovement with sales. Second, the cash flows of firms with high levels of
operating leases are more sensitive to aggregate shocks than those of firms with lower
levels of operating leases. Third, I show that high-lease ratio firms have more volatile
stock returns and cash flow growth.
The risks associated with holding non-cancellable operating leases are mentioned in
the business press. For example, when UAL Corp., parent of United Airlines, filed for
Chapter 11 in December 2002, it had US$ 25.2 billion of assets, US$ 22.2 billion of
liabilities and US$ 24.5 billion in non-cancellable operating lease commitments. A UAL
spokeswoman acknowledges the company’s high lease costs were a factor in UAL’s
bankruptcy.3 Similarly, US Airways filed for Chapter 11 in August 2002. Its chief
executive officer, David Siegel, explained,4
2Graham et al. (1998) report that operating leases constitute 42% of fixed claims, whereas
capital leases and debt are 6% and 52% of fixed claims, respectively, in the 1981–1992
Compustat data.
3 JonathanWeil, ‘HowLeases Play a Shadowy Role in Accounting’, TheWall Street Journal,
September 22, 2004.
4 ‘US Airways to Complete Restructuring Plan in Chapter 11 Reorganization’, PRNewswire,
August 12, 2002.
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‘While US Airways was able to successfully negotiate cost savings from many of its
employee groups, the company determined that it was unlikely to conclude consensual
negotiations with certain vendors, aircraft lessors and financiers in a timeframe necessary to
complete an out-of-court restructuring. Siegel cited as factors the large number of lessors
and financiers and the company’s inability to reject surplus aircraft leases and return excess
aircraft outside of Chapter 11.’
The inflexibility of the firm’s lease obligations creates cyclicality in the firm’s cash
flows, which is related to the concept of operating leverage.5 For shareholders, lease
expense is a form of leverage that makes equity riskier. Danthine and Donaldson (2002)
propose a general equilibrium model with labour-induced operating leverage.6 Their
model with fixed labour costs generates operating leverage and provides a better match to
the observed equity premium. Tuzel and Zhang (2013) show that firms have lower
industry-adjusted average returns in areas where wages strongly comove with aggregate
shocks. The idea of labour-induced operating leverage, that is, wages’ limited
comovement with revenues affecting firm risk, can be extended to operating leases.
During recessions revenues fall but lease commitments do not fall by as much as
revenues. These precommitted lease payments transfer the risk to shareholders.
Therefore, in the setting of this paper, the operating leveragemechanism is created by the
firm’s non-cancellable leasing contracts.
The firm’s financing and leasing decisions are possibly related. Debt and leases have
been studied as both substitutes and complements.7 Chen et al. (2014) argue that firms
with more inflexible operating costs endogenously choose lower financial leverage
ex ante to reduce the likelihood of default in future bad states. Supporting the substitute
argument, I find that firms that use higher levels of operating leases have lower financial
leverage. To investigate whether a firm’s financial leverage has an impact on the
relationship between its operating leases and stock returns, I control for financial
leverage in the Fama–Macbeth (1974) regressions and perform portfolio sorts with
unlevered returns. Both results confirm that the lease premium is independent of financial
leverage effects.
This paper makes the following contributions. A large body of literature on asset
pricing links firm characteristics to stock returns in the cross-section. Fama and French
(2008) provide a survey of this literature. To this literature, my paper adds the firm-level
lease rate as a variable that constitutes part of a firm’s operating leverage risk and
establishes a link to expected stock returns.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature related to operating leverage. While the
role of operating leverage on firm risk is studied in the theoretical works of Rubinstein
(1973) and Lev (1974); there is limited supporting empirical evidence on the relationship
between the firm’s operating leverage and stock returns. The difficulty in measuring
operating leverage is deciding on which costs are fixed, and on the degree and duration of
the inflexibility of costs. Novy-Marx (2011) uses a measure of operating leverage – the
5See Lev (1974); Mandelker and Rhee (1984); Carlson et al. (2004) and Novy-Marx (2011).
6See Gourio (2007); Chen et al. (2011); Favilukis and Lin (2013) and Donangelo (2014) for
examples of labour induced operating leverage studies.
7See Ang and Peterson (1984), Lewis and Schallheim (1992), Graham et al. (1998); Lasfer
and Levis (1998) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009).
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firm’s cost of goods sold plus selling, general, and administrative expenses, divided by
the firm’s total assets – and argues that firms with high operating leverage have higher
expected returns. This measure includes a large set of costs, such as material and
overhead costs or advertising and marketing expenses. The degree of the inflexibility of
these costs is mixed. Some of these costs are more variable than fixed. Although non-
cancellable operating leases are only a component of a firm’s inflexible commitments,
they have a very high degree of inflexibility compared to other potential fixed costs. The
firm discloses them as non-cancellable. Therefore, I can use the level of operating lease
commitments as a direct measure of operating leverage. Examining the individual effect
of operating leases is informative about the relationship between cash flow sensitivity,
operating leverage risk and expected returns.
Third, this paper contributes to the cost stickiness literature in accounting8 and the
wage stickiness literature in asset pricing. The literature related to cost stickiness studies
adjustment costs, the magnitude of sales changes, expectations of future sales, and
managerial empire-building behaviour as reasons for cost stickiness in the cross-section.
The present paper adds contractual operating lease commitments as a reason for cost
stickiness.
Finally, this paper contributes to the accounting literature that examines operating
leases and equity risk. Imhoff et al. (1993), using 6 years of data, find that in the airline
and grocery industries, debt-to-equity ratios, that are adjusted by capitalising operating
leases are more highly correlated with the standard deviation of stock returns than those
that are not so adjusted. Ely (1995) tests whether using operating lease-adjusted
debt-to-equity and return-on-assets (ROA) ratios has more power in explaining the
standard deviations of stock returns. The author’s sample period is 9 years, with 202
firms. Ely finds a significant relationship between the standard deviation of monthly
returns and the debt-equity adjustment for operating leases. However, she finds mixed
results with adjustments made to ROA ratios. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) also find that the
cost-of-equity-capital is positively associated with adjustments to financial leverage
from capitalising off-balance sheet operating leases. The present study covers a longer
period with a broader data set than previous studies, and investigates the direct
relationship between operating leases-induced operating leverage and stock returns,
rather than the relationship between financial leverage with capitalised operating leases
and volatile stock returns or the cost-of-equity-capital.
In summary, this article shows that firms with high levels of non-cancellable operating
lease commitments have more operating leverage, which amplifies exposure to business
cycle risk, and consequently, these firms have higher expected stock returns. Section 2
examines the relationship between lease commitments and expected returns, sales,
financial leverage, industry effects and cash flow sensitivity. Section 3 concludes the
study.
2 Empirical Analysis and Results
This section demonstrates the empirical link between a firm’s non-cancellable operating
lease commitments and expected stock returns in the cross-section. A measure of the
firm’s level of operating leases relative to its total assets is constructed using widely
8See among others Anderson et al. (2003) and Chen et al. (2012).
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Non-cancellable Operating Leases 579
available accounting data. This ratio is called the operating lease ratio. I follow two
complementary empirical methodologies to examine the relationship between the firm’s
operating lease ratio and its stock returns. In the first approach, I construct portfolios
sorted on the lease ratio, and in the second approach, I run firm-level Fama–MacBeth
regressions. These approaches allow a cross-check of the results and guide further testing
to determine whether my operating lease variable is systematically related to firm risk.
2.1 Data
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 requires firms to disclose future
minimum rental payments for each of the five succeeding fiscal years and aggregate
payments for years thereafter. For operating leases, Compustat has fields for 1-year
through 5-year-out minimum operating lease commitments (MRC1, MRC2, MRC3,
MRC4, MRC5), 5-year total lease commitment (MRCT), commitments thereafter
(beyond 5 years) (MRCTA), and rental expenses (XRENT). Short-term leases with a lease
term of less than 1 year are reported under XRENT.MRC1 is the minimum rental expense
due in the first year under all existing non-cancellable operating leases.9 For year t,
MRC1 is reported at the end of year t–1 in a footnote to the balance sheet. Therefore, I use
theminimum lease commitments due in year 1 (MRC1) lagged by 1 year as in Sharpe and
Nguyen (1995) for the level of a firm’s non-cancellable annual operating lease expense.
This annual payment is divided by the firm’s total assets. Using net property, plant, and
equipment or the firm’s total operating expenses instead of its total assets gives similar
results.
Alternatively, I can estimate the present value of a firm’s total non-cancellable
operating lease commitments and use it instead ofMRC1 (an annual expense measure).
There are three major approaches in the literature for estimating the stock value of
operating leases. The first is the present value method. This approach capitalises the
present value of minimum lease payments for 5 years (MRC1, MRC2, MRC3, MRC4,
MRC5) plus the ‘thereafter’ value (MRCTA) discounted at an appropriate discount rate.
The second method is Moody’s factor method, which capitalises operating leases by
eight times the current-year rent expense. The third method of operating lease
capitalisation, suggested by Lim et al. (2005), uses the perpetuity estimate of the
operating lease payment. Lim et al. argue that the first method is known to significantly
underestimate leased capital, since lease commitments are a lower bound on obligations
and do not account for lease renewals; in addition, the availability ofMRCTA is limited
prior to 2000. The second and third methods either multiply or divide current-year
operating lease expenses by a particular multiple or discount rate. Therefore, mymeasure
of minimum operating lease commitments is a conservative measure of the non-
cancellable operating lease obligation and is free from assumptions about the discount
rates used in the estimation and the firm’s accounting practices with respect to operating
leases. I also study only non-cancellable minimum rental commitments. However, some
operating leases are cancellable but subject to termination penalties. This type of
contractual obligation also contributes to the operating leverage effect.
9At the end of each year, the firm reports its future rental commitments. For example at the
end of year t, MRC2 is the minimum future lease payment due in year tþ2.
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The key variable, the operating lease ratio, is as follows:





I also track the following variables as control variables: Size is market capitalisation of
the firm in June of the year tþ1, from CRSP. Book-to-market ratio is measured for the
fiscal year ending in calendar year t.10 I compare my lease ratio with Novy-Marx’s
(2011) operating leverage measure, which is the sum of the cost of goods sold plus
selling, general and administrative expenses, divided by total assets. Financial leverage
is the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. As in
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), I include cash and short-term investments to total assets
ratio, and cash flow (income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and
amortisation) divided by total assets to indicate firms that are financially constrained.
I also compute the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, the Whited-Wu (2006) index and
the Hadlock-Pierce (2010) size–age index as alternative financial constraint measures.11
Asset growth is change in the natural log of assets from year t–1 to year t, as in Cooper
et al. (2008). Inventory growth is change in the natural log of total inventories, all
measured from year t–1 to year t. The return on equity (ROE) is net income in
year t divided by book equity for year t. The return on assets (ROA) is net income in year t
divided by total assets for year t. The investment rate is capital expenditureminus sales of
property, plant, and equipment at time t divided by the average property, plant, and
equipment at time t–1 and t, as in Belo et al. (2014).
The sample is an unbalanced panel with 4,926 distinct firms. Accounting data are from
Compustat and span from 1975 to 2012. Monthly stock returns are from CRSP and from
July 1976 to December 2013. My sample begins in 1975 since MRC1 is not available
before 1975. Approximately 70% of firms in the Compustat population during this
study’s sample years report their minimum non-cancellable operating lease expense. I
include only companies with ordinary shares and listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.
I exclude firms with missing Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, negative
book values, missing June market values, and missing or zero minimum lease
commitments due in one year. As is standard, I omit regulated firms whose primary SIC
code is between 4900 and 4999 (regulated firms) or between 6000 and 6999 (financial
firms). I require firms to have a December fiscal-year end to align the accounting data
10Following Fama and French, I define book equity as stockholders equity, plus balance sheet
deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), plus post-retirement benefit liabilities
(if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use
redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that order) for the book value of preferred stock. If
stockholder equity is not available, I use the book value of common equity plus the book
value of preferred stock. If common equity is not available, I compute stockholder equity as
book value of assets minus total liabilities.
11The five-variable Kaplan–Zingales index is constructed following Lamont et al. (2001).
The size–age index is calculated as (–0.737 Size)þ (0.043 Size2) – (0.040 Age), where
Size equals the log of inflation-adjusted book assets and Age is the number of years the firm is
listed with a non-missing stock price in Compustat. Size is winsorized (i.e., capped) at (the log
of) US$ 4.5 billion and Age is winsorized at 37 years.
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across firms. In other words, my sample includes firms with a fiscal year ending only in
December to ensure that the accounting data are not outdated by the time of the sorting
procedure. However, my results are very similar if I drop this December fiscal year-end
restriction (see section 2.11). Following Fama and French (1993), I include only firms
with at least 2 years of data in the sample. The data for the five Fama–French (2014)
factors – small-minus-big, SMB; high-minus-low, HML; market, MKT; robust-minus-
weak, RMW; and conservative-minus-aggressive, CMA – are from Kenneth French’s
web page.
2.2 Portfolio sorts
I construct 10 one-way-sorted lease portfolios and investigate the characteristics of these
portfolios’ post-formation average stock returns. Following Fama and French (1993), I
match CRSP stock return data from July of year tþ1 to June of year tþ2 with lease ratio
information for the fiscal year ending in year t, allowing for a minimum of a 6-month gap
between the fiscal year-end and return tests. At the end of each June in year tþ1, I sort the
firms in the sample according to their lease ratio and group them into decile portfolios.
Table 1 below shows the dispersion in the descriptive characteristics of the lease ratio-
sorted portfolios, and Table 2 shows the time-series averages of the cross-sectional
Spearman rank correlations among other firm characteristics. The first row in Table 1
provides data on the average level of the lease ratio of the firms in these decile portfolios.
The results in Table 1 indicate a monotonic relationship between the lease ratio and size.
Firms that have large non-cancellable lease obligations are small, with low financial
leverage. These firms carry higher cash levels to fund lease payments and are financially
constrained, as similarly measured in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) and Cosci et al.
(2013). The profitability measure, ROA, which is also highly correlated to Eisfeldt and
Rampini’s internal available funds measure (cash flow), is monotonically and negatively
related to operating lease commitments. The relationship with the other measure of
profitability, ROE, and the operating lease ratio is not monotonic. Asset growth and
inventory growth, both decrease monotonically with operating leases. The high
correlation between firm size and the lease ratio is expected, as documented in Eisfeldt
and Rampini (2009). The high positive correlation between Novy-Marx’s (2011)
operating leverage and my lease ratio is due to the similarity in the numerator. A firm’s
operating lease payments constitute a portion of the selling, general and administrative
expenses. Despite the correlation, I show that my lease ratio has a significant impact after
controlling for Novy-Marx’s measure of operating leverage in Fama–MacBeth
regressions.
One reason why firms lease their capital versus owning is given by Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2009), who argue that although leasing is more costly due to the agency
problem induced by the separation of ownership and control, financially constrained
firms prefer leasing due to the benefit of higher debt capacity. Therefore, more financially
constrained firms, which have limited internal funds, lease a larger proportion of their
capital than less constrained firms do. The authors use the ratio of cash flow-to-assets as
the most direct measure of available internal funds. In Table 1, cash flows-to-assets is
negatively correlated with the proportion of leased capital. Firms with high lease
commitments have lower cash flow-to-asset ratios and higher Kaplan and Zingales index
values. The other measure of available funds, the cash-to-assets ratio, is positively
correlated to my lease ratio. This cash measure, as explained by Eisfeldt and Rampini
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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(2009), represents net working capital to fund firm operations. Therefore, firms with
higher lease ratios have higher cash balances to compensate for their inflexible higher
lease costs. However, their retained earnings are lower to finance capital investments.
The fraction of interest expense to non-cancellable operating leases is also decreasing
with the lease ratio. For firms in the higher lease ratio deciles, lease payments exceed
interest expense.
2.3 Returns of lease ratio sorted portfolios
Table 3 investigates the relationship between my lease ratio and expected excess returns
(excess of the risk-free rate). Ex-post realised stock returns are used as a proxy for
expected returns. The table shows the dispersion in both equal and value-weighted
portfolio returns for firms sorted into 10 portfolios based on the lease ratio. Expected
returns of the portfolios increase monotonically with the lease ratio. The annualised
difference between the returns of high- and low-lease ratio firms is 11.0% for equal-
weighted portfolios and 4.7% for value-weighted portfolios, both spreads being
statistically significant.
To understand the relationship between the lease ratio and expected returns over
business cycles, I separate my sample into expansionary and contractionary periods
around the portfolio formation period (see Imrohoroglu and Tuzel, 2014 for a similar
approach). I use (National Bureau of Economic Research) NBER business cycle dates as
reported on the NBER website. I designate recession/expansion in June of each year and
examine the returns of lease ratio-sorted portfolios over the succeeding 12 months.
I find that the positive relationship between the lease ratio and expected returns
persists in both expansions and in contractions for equal-weighted portfolios. However,
there are significant differences in returns over business cycles. The average level of
expected returns is much higher in recessions than in expansions. The annualised spread
between the returns of high and low lease ratio portfolios is also much higher during
contractions, 29.0%, than during expansions, 7.2%, in equal-weighted portfolios. For
value-weighted portfolios, the spread is 20.3% and is significant during contractions.
However, the value-weighted spread is not significant during expansions.
Low-lease ratio firms have lower expected returns in recessions and high-lease ratio
firms have lower expected returns during expansions compared to their average returns
during all states. The increase in expected returns of high-lease portfolios is particularly
large, from 18.1% in expansions to 37.8% in contractions. For low lease ratio firms,
expected returns decrease from 10.9% in expansions to 8.8% in contractions in equal-
weighted portfolios, and they decrease from 7.5% to –1.2% in value-weighted portfolios.
A simple two-sample t-test with unequal variances confirms that the return spread in
expansions is statistically different than in recessions.The t-statistics are –3.84 for the
equal-weighted spread portfolio and –2.53 for the value-weighted spread portfolio. My
interpretation of the spread in expected returns across these portfolios, especially in
recessions, centres around the risk premia associated with the higher risk of high-lease
ratio firms.
2.4 Firm-level Fama–MacBeth regressions
Portfolio sorts indicate a statistically and economically significant positive relationship
between the lease ratio and returns. I now use a different approach to investigate the
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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strength of the relationship between lease rates and stock returns. I run firm-level
Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973) to predict stock
returns using the lagged firm-level lease rates as return predictors.
I estimate the following cross-sectional regression for firm i¼ 1, . . .,N in each month:
Ri ¼/ þbli þ gDi þ ei ð2Þ
where, i is a firm index, and monthly returns are denoted by Ri. My measure of the lease
ratio is denoted by li andDi is a vector of controls. I measure li and all control variables
based on accounting ratios at the end of the preceding year. I run the cross-sectional
regression for each month separately. I then take the time series of the estimated monthly
cross-sectional regression coefficients and calculate the mean regression coefficients. To
test their significance, I report autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity corrected Newey
and West (1987) standard errors for the estimated coefficients. The average regression
coefficients are reported in Table 4.
I find that the lease rate is strongly positively related to expected returns. The cross-
sectional regression, in which the lease rate is the only explanatory variable, produces an
average slope of 15.98. The magnitude of the effect is significant both statistically and
economically. The 15.98 average regression coefficient translates into approximately
6.8% higher expected returns for firms in the highest lease decile compared to firms in the
lowest lease decile. When I divide my sample into two time periods, the results are not
sensitive to the sample period, although the effect is stronger in the first half of the sample
period, fiscal years 1975 to 1993.
To understand themarginal predictive power of the lease rate, I control for several firm
characteristics that could be related to my lease ratio variable. As in Fama and French
(2008), I do not include market beta, since the market beta for individual stocks is not
precisely measured in the data. I find that the cross-sectional regressions that include the
log size, log book-to-market, momentum, and operating leverage all produce positive
and statistically significant average slopes for the lease ratio.
In the literature, empirical evidence on the relationship between financial leverage and
stock returns is mixed. When other firm characteristics are included in regressions,
financial leverage often becomes insignificant in predicting returns (Fama and French,
1992).12 The firm’s financial leverage does not impact the relationship between its
operating leases and stock returns.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) argue that more financially constrained firms lease more
of their capital than less constrained firms do. My results could be driven by financial
constraints rather than the operating leverage effect. Therefore I control for four different
measures of financial constraints, cash flow scaled by assets, the Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) index, the size–age index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and the Whited–Wu
(2006) index.13 After controlling for these measures of financial constraints, the
relationship between operating leases and returns remains. Cash flow scaled by assets
ratio has a high correlation with ROA (0.88) and size–age (SA) index has a high
correlation with size (0.84). Among those four measures, Hadlock and Pierce’s size–age
12George and Hwang (2010) provide further evidence that the book leverage premium is
weak and potentially negative.
13The six-variable Whited–Wu index is constructed following Whited and Wu (2006).
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index is the most powerful and these financial constraint measures confirm the
relationship that greater financial constraint leads to higher stock returns.When I include
other control variables and financial constraint measures all together in the
Fama–MacBeth regressions, the choice of financial constraint measure does not have
an impact on the significance of the lease ratio.
The empirical evidence shows that the firm’s capital investment is inversely related to
expected returns.14 In Table 1, firmswith high lease ratios have lower asset and inventory
growth rates. However, the correlation between the firm’s investment rate and lease ratio
is positive. In the cross-sectional regressions, when I control for these investment-related
variables, the operating lease ratio’s coefficient remains significant and positive. These
findings show that the operating lease effect is not due to investment and profitability
relationships.
I also control for the effects of possible information assymmetries created by the
nature of operating lease transactions. Operating leases are typically found in the
footnotes of financial statements and may not be properly reported. This accounting
deficiency causes information risk. Probability of informed trade (PIN) is used as a
measure of information risk in the literature (e.g., Easley et al., 2002). The PIN estimates
span the period 1983–2001.15 Although the coefficient of the lease ratio is lower when
the PIN measure is included in the regressions, it remains positive and statistically
significant.
In the literature, taxes are widely seen as one of the most important reasons to lease.
According to Lasfer and Levis (1998), ‘while large companies lease mainly for tax
savings, small companies lease to overcome their inability to access debt to finance
growth opportunities and survival.’ Lewis and Schallheim’s (1992) model implies that
those firms with lesser ability to use tax shields are those for which leasing is most
advantageous. I find that firms with high lease ratios have lower marginal tax rates.16
Although the question of why firms use leases is not the focus of this paper, taxes may
have a mechanical link to firm risk. When I control for marginal tax rates in my
regressions, operating leases have a coefficient of 6.24, which is statistically significant
at the 1% level.
Following Fama and French (2008), Table 5 presents the cross-sectional regression
results for three groups of stocks – microcap, small, and big stocks – estimated
separately. The three groups are classified using the Fama and French (2008) size
breakpoints of the smallest 20%, the middle 20% to 50%, and the largest 50% of all
NYSE firms. After controlling for size, book-to-market, and momentum, I observe that
the relationship between operating leases and expected returns is stronger in smaller
stocks than in bigger stocks. Gomes and Schmid (2010) explain that the relationship
between financial leverage and stock returns is inconclusive because of the changing firm
risk over the firm’s lifecycle. In their investment-based asset pricing model, mature,
bigger firms have greater financial leverage with low underlying asset risk, while small
firms are more subject to operating leverage. Fixed costs of default are more important
14See for example, Cochrane (1991), Titman et al. (2004), and Cooper et al. (2008).
15PIN estimates are from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s web site. Only NYSE and AMEX listed firms
have PIN measures in this sample.
16Marginal tax rate estimates of Blouin et al. (2010) are used. The data are available from
1980.
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for small firms. Cross-sectional regressions excluding microcaps and including control
variables also produce significant coefficients for the lease ratio.
2.5 Asset pricing tests
To investigate whether the variation in excess returns across these portfolios reflects a
compensation for risk, I conduct time series asset pricing tests using the CAPM, Carhart
(1997) four factor model, and the Fama–French (2014) five factor model as the
benchmark asset pricing models. Fama–French five-factor model augments the Fama–
French (1993) three-factor model by adding profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA)
factors. As demonstrated in Table 1, my lease ratio is related to size at the firm level.
Therefore, I explore whether the returns of lease-ratio-sorted portfolios are systemati-
cally related to the SMB factor.
Table 6 presents the alphas (pricing errors) and betas of lease-ratio-sorted portfolios
for the CAPM, Carhart and Fama–French models. Alphas are estimated as intercepts
from the regressions of lease ratio-sorted portfolio excess returns on the market excess
return portfolio (MKT), SMB, HML, momentum (MOM), robust minus weak (RMW)
and conservative minus aggressive (CMA) factors. RMW is the return spread of the
portfolios of the most profitable firms minus the least profitable, and CMA is the return
spread of the portfolios of firms that invest conservatively minus aggressively. Fama and
French (2014) measure profitability by revenues minus the cost of goods sold, interest
expense, and selling, general and administrative expenses, all divided by book equity and
their measure of investment rate is the growth of total assets divided by total assets. The
top panel of the table reports the results for equal-weighted portfolios, and the lower
panel reports value-weighted portfolio results. I find that portfolios with high lease ratios
load heavily on SMB, whereas the loadings of the low lease ratio portfolios are low, even
negative in value-weighted portfolios. The loadings on HML, RMW and CMA are non-
monotonic. Value-weighted high lease ratio portfolios have higher loadings on MKT
Table 5
Fama–MacBeth regressions employing the lease rate across different size groups
This table reports the results from Fama–MacBeth regressions of firm returns on firm lease ratios. Firms
are assigned to size groups at the end of June each year. Microcap stocks (micro) are below the 20th
percentile of the NYSE market cap at the end of June, small stocks are between the 20th and 50th
percentiles, and big stocks are above the NYSE median. All but micro combines small and big stocks.
OPLEASE is the ratio of operating lease payments to total assets. B/M is the book-to-market ratio, SIZE
is the market capitalization, MOM is the past performance measured at 12 to 2 months. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses next to the coefficient estimates, computed as in Newey-West (1987) with four
lags. The sample covers July 1976 to December 2013.
Micro-cap Small-cap Big-cap All but micro
OPLEASE 6.27 (2.86) 5.48 (1.57) 7.19 (1.65) 5.97 (1.78)
Log(SIZE) –0.63 (–6.82) –0.05 (–0.55) –0.07 (–1.41) –0.10 (–2.15)
Log(B/M) 0.10 (1.01) 0.21 (2.08) 0.18 (1.95) 0.19 (2.13)
MOM 0.00 (1.61) 0.00 (1.59) 0.00 (1.23) 0.00 (1.35)
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compared to low-lease ratio portfolios. Dropping the momentum factor has no material
impact on these results.
None of the models completely explains the return spread in the equally weighted
portfolios: The High-Low lease ratio portfolio has a CAPM alpha of 11.04%, a Carhart
alpha of 11.40%, and Fama–French five factor alpha of 10.08%, all statistically
significant. The spreads in the alphas of the value-weighted portfolios are not statistically
significant. Based on these results, I do not propose that the lease ratio is a separate risk
factor that is not captured by these factors, but rather that the lease ratio is systematically
related to SMB.
2.6 Cost inflexibility
Eventually all costs are variable in the long run. In the short run, it is hard to decide which
costs are fixed, their degree of inflexibility and their duration of inflexibility (one month,
one quarter or one year). As Novy-Marx (2011) explains, for operating leverage to
significantly impact the riskiness of the firm requires both high levels of operating costs,
and ‘limited operational flexibility’, which is the revenue beta minus cost beta. The level
of fixed costs and the degree of operational inflexibility could be correlated across firms.
Firmswith high levels of inflexible costs could becomemore proficient inmanaging their
fixed cost exposure. This leads to higher cost betas and high operational flexibility.
For example, one of the largest expense items, wage expense is sticky and acts as afixed
cost according to Hall (2005) and Favilukis and Lin (2013). At the same time, Tuzel and
Zhang (2013) show that there are differences among firms in their flexibility to adjust
wages in response to aggregate shocks. Firms located in cyclical areas can adjust wages
better than firms located in less cyclical areas, leading to lower risk for the former. Labour
is possibly a quasi-fixed cost and, since labour expense is not reported on firm income
statements as a separate expense item but, rather, under the cost of goods sold and selling,
general and administrative expenses, it is difficult to measure its degree of flexibility.
We know that non-cancellable lease commitments are non-cancellable except when
the firm enters into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Interest expense and pension and retirement
expense are other potential inflexible operating costs to the firm and are reported
separately in the financial statements.We have limited information on the ability of firms
to manage their exposure to these costs. For example, firms enter into interest rate swaps
and financial derivatives contracts to manage their interest rate risk related to fixed rate
borrowings. In addition, interest rates fluctuate according to business cycles. Generally,
in good times interest rates are high, and in bad times interest rates are low. Interest rates
decreased over the 3 years during the financial crisis and firms benefited from this drop
through lower interest expenses if the total borrowing remained the same. Table 7 shows
that these other potential fixed costs – pension and retirement expense and interest
expense – have a higher degree of operating flexibility than operating leases do.
First, I test the flexibility of costs using aggregate data, and then at the firm level. Fixed
costs should have limited comovement with sales. For each year, I aggregate all the sales,
non-cancellable lease commitments, interest expenses, and pension and retirement
expenses for firms into aggregate-level variables. I calculate the growth rate of these
series. Then, I regress different cost components on aggregate sales growth. Annual data
are from 1976 to 2012, with 37 observations. Table 7 reports the coefficients, t-statistics
in parentheses, and R2 values. Operating lease expense have a much smaller coefficient
and R2 values compared to other cost items.
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Next, I follow Anderson et al. (2003) and investigate the sensitivities of these costs to
increases and decreases in sales. I estimate the following regression:
LogðCosti;t=Costi;t1Þ ¼
b0 þ b1logðSalesi;t=Salesi;t1Þ þb2ðDummyi;tlogðSalesi;t=Salesi;tÞÞþei;t:
ð3Þ
where Cost is either a non-cancellable lease commitment, interest expense, or pension
and retirement expense for firm i. Dummy, takes the value of one when sales decreases
between years t1 and t, and zero otherwise. The coefficient b1 measures the percentage
increase in costs with a 1% increase in sales. Because the value of Dummy is one when
sales decreases, the sum of the coefficients, b1þb2, measures the percentage decrease in
costs with a 1% decrease in sales. Table 8 reports the coefficients, the t-statistics in
parentheses and R2 values from the pooled ordinary least squares regression. The b1
coefficient of operating leases is smaller than for other costs and b1 þb2 is close to zero,
meaning that a 1% decline in sales results in a 0.02% increase in operating lease
expenses. Although interest and pension expenses are sticky, the combined measure of
inflexibility has a higher b1 þb2 coefficient, 0.13, than operating lease expenses
alone, –0.02.
These results jointly indicate that among these costs, a non-cancellable operating lease
expense behaves as a fixed cost and has less comovement with sales than other costs do.
Therefore, operating lease commitments are a source of operating leverage risk to thefirm.
2.7 Unlevered equity returns
I also consider whether the impact of the lease ratio is related to financial leverage. In
Table 1, high lease ratio firms have lower financial leverage. This negative relation could
imply that leasing and debt are substitutes, or that managers offset the risk of lease
commitments on equity through lower financial leverage. In the Fama-MacBeth
Table 7
Comovement of different costs with respect to sales at the market level
This table reports the results from regressions of different market (aggregate) cost growths on market
sales growth. Each year, operating lease expense, interest expense, pension and retirement expense and
sales are summed over all firms that year. Growth rate is calculated as the natural logarithm of the
growth rate. Annual data are from 1976 to 2012 with 37 observations. Standard errors are Newey-West











0.36 (2.76) 1.04 (5.51) 1.13 (3.71)
R2 23.71% 43.76% 37.51%
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regressions, financial leverage has no impact on the marginal power of the lease ratio.
However, I cross-check my results using portfolio sorts with unlevered excess returns.
For each firm, I compute the unlevered cost of equity from the standardweighted average
cost of capital formula, as follows:
RUi;m;t ¼ Ri;m;t 1 Li;t1
 þ RBi;m;tLi;t1ð1 rt1Þ
h i
 RTm;t ð4Þ
where Ri,m,t denotes the monthly stock return of firm i over month m of year t, R
T
m;t
denotes the 1-month Treasury bill rate in month m of year t, RBi;m;t denotes the monthly
debt return of firm i over month m of year t, and Li,t–1 denotes the leverage ratio, defined
as the book value of debt over the sum of the book value of debt plus the market value of
equity at the end of year t–1. rt–1 is the firm’s tax rate.
Firm-level corporate bond data are limited, and only a small percentage of firms have
corporate bond ratings in Compustat (item SPLTICRM). To construct bond returns,
RBi;m;t, for firms without bond ratings, I followLiu et al. (2009). The computation involves
imputing bond ratings for all firms in my sample following the procedure of Blume et al.
(1998). To impute bond ratings, I first estimate an ordered probit model that relates credit
ratings to observed explanatory variables using all firms that have credit ratings. Second,
from this regression, I calculate the cut-off values for each rating. Third, I estimate the
credit scores for firms without credit ratings using the coefficients estimated from the
ordered probit model and impute bond ratings by applying the cut-off values for the
different credit ratings. Finally, I match the corresponding corporate bond returns to a
given credit rating for all firms with the same credit rating. The bond return data are from
Barclays Capital US Long Term Corporate Bond Returns for the Aaa, Aa, A, Baa and
high yield rating categories. The data source is Morningstar.
The ordered probit model contains the following explanatory variables: interest
coverage;17 ratio of operating income after depreciation (item OIADP) plus interest
Table 8
Comovement of different costs with respect to sales at the firm level
This table reports the results from regressions of different cost growths on sales growth. The ratios are
winsorised at the top and bottom 0.5% to decrease the influence of outliers. Only firmswith non-missing
non-cancellable lease commitment, interest expense, pension and retirement expense growth rates are
included in the regressions to be able to compare the regression coefficients. The table reports the







b1 0.46 (42.26) 0.88 (44.00) 0.64 (42.43)
b2 –0.48 (–16.87) –0.48 (–9.30) –0.19 (–4.86)
b1þb2 –0.02 0.39 0.45
R2 6% 9% 10%
17 Interest coverage ratios of less than zero are replaced by zero and any interest coverage
ratio greater than 10 is set to 104, as in Blume et al. (1998).
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expense (item XINT) to interest expense; operating margin, ratio of operating income
before depreciation (item OIBDP) to sales (item SALE), long-term leverage, ratio of
long-term debt (item DLTT) to assets (item AT); total leverage, ratio of long-term debt
plus debt in current liabilities (item DLC) plus short-term borrowing (item BAST) to
assets; natural logarithm of the market value of equity (item PRCC_C times item CSHO)
deflated to 1973 by the consumer price index; andmarket beta (CRSP data itemBETAV)
and standard deviation of returns (CRSP data item SDEVV). Data on rating categories
are available from January 1973 onward. I measure rt–1 as the statutory corporate
income tax rate. From 1973 to 1978, the tax rate was 48%, dropping to 46% in 1986, and
then to 40% in 1987, and further to 34% in 1987 and then staying at that level thereafter.
The data source is the Commerce Clearing House, annual publications.
I repeat the portfolio sorts using unlevered expected excess returns as the cost of
capital measure. Table 9 presents the equal- and value-weighted expected excess
unlevered returns of decile portfolios sorted by lease ratio. In equal-weighted and value-
weighted returns, the spreads are slightly smaller, but still significant.
2.8 Industry adjusted lease ratio
The capital composition of firms can vary across industries. For example, airlines and
retail industries are known to be heavy users of operating leases. To compare firms from
different industries, I calculate industry-adjusted lease ratios for firms. Every year, I form
industry portfolios using two-digit SIC codes and calculate the average lease ratio within
each portfolio. Then I subtract the corresponding industry’s average lease ratio from the
firm’s lease ratio. The industry adjusted lease ratios of firms are the lease ratios in excess
of their industry averages. In June of each year, I rank stocks according to this industry-
adjusted lease ratio and group them into decile portfolios. There must be at least five
firms each year from each two digit SIC code to include firms from that industry.
Following Fama and French (1993), I match the CRSP stock return data from July of year
tþ1 to June of year tþ2 with the industry-adjusted lease ratio for the fiscal year ending in
year t. Table 10 presents the excess returns and unlevered returns of industry-adjusted
lease ratio-sorted portfolios. The results show that the spread is higher (lower) in value-
weighted (equal-weighted) portfolios sorted with industry adjustment compared to the
portfolios formed without industry adjustment.
As inNovy-Marx (2011), I decompose the operating lease ratio into industry and intra-
industry components using two different methodologies. The first method uses the
operating lease ratio demeaned by the industry average as the intra-industry operating
lease ratio. This industry adjusted lease ratio generates significant spread in returns as
shown in Table 10. The industry average lease ratio is the component of the lease ratio
related to industry variation. The second method uses the firm’s operating lease ratio
ranking within its industry as the intra-industry measure and the ranking of the operating
lease ratio of the firm’s industry as the industry measure. These rankings are percentiles
parameterised between zero and one.
Table 11 shows the results from Fama–MacBeth regressions employing measures of
the operating lease ratio within and across industries. Under both decomposition
methods, the intra-industry measure has significantly more power than the industry
measure. The coefficients of the intra-industry measure are large and highly significant,
while the coefficients of the industry measure are smaller and insignificant. These results
further confirm that the operating lease operating leverage effect is independent of
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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industry effects. The impact of operating leases on the risk and returns of the firm is more
pronounced within industries than across industries.
2.9 Cash flow sensitivity
I investigate further whether there are systematic differences in the sensitivity of high
and low lease ratio firm cash flows to aggregate shocks in the economy. Such a difference
could support the operating leverage mechanism behind the risk and return differences
between high- and low-lease ratio firms. I expect that the cash flows of firms with high
lease ratios would be more sensitive to aggregate shocks than the cash flows of low-lease
ratio firms. The measure for cash flow is firm income before extraordinary items plus
depreciation. I estimate the following pooled time series/cross-sectional regressions:
DCashFlowi;t ¼ /i þ bDCashFlowagg;t þ ui;t ð5Þ
whereDCashFlowi,t is the change in cash flows of firm i between year t–1 and t, scaled by
firm assets in year t–1. The term /i captures the individual firm effect and I proxy for
aggregate shocks with the cross-sectional average of DCashFlowi,t over all firms in the
sample. Since I useDCashFlow on each side of the regression, at the firm level on the left
hand side and aggregate on the right hand side, I can interpret the regression coefficient as
the firm’s cash flow beta to aggregate shocks. I divide firms into 10 lease ratio deciles
based on their lease ratio in year t–1, and I run panel regressions in each lease ratio decile
and present the regression coefficients in Table 12. High-lease ratio firms have greater
sensitivity to aggregate shocks in the economy. The regression coefficients are 1.45 for
firms in the highest lease ratio group and 0.27 for the lowest lease ratio group. Firms’
cash flow betas increase monotonically with their operating lease ratios.
The link between firm sensitivity to existing sources of risk and the firm’s operating
leverage implies that volatility should increase with operating leverage. I show that the
Table 12
Cash flow regressions for lease ratio-sorted panels
The top panel in this table presents the results of panel regressions of changes in firm-level cash flow on
changes in aggregate cash flow. Changes in cash flow are measured as the level difference between cash
flows at time t and t–1, scaled by total assets at time t–1. Changes in aggregate cash flow aremeasured as
the cross-sectional average of firm-level changes. Firms are sorted into 10 decile groups based on the
past year’s lease ratios. The sample period is from 1975 to 2012. Firm fixed effects are included.
Standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are in parentheses. The bottom panel presents the
standard deviation of the average cash flow growth of the lease ratio-sorted decile portfolios.
Dependent Variable: DCashFlowi,t
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
DCashFlowagg,t 0.27 0.40 0.47 0.69 0.54 0.70 0.69 0.69 1.06 1.45
(2.07) (3.80) (3.42) (4.02) (3.44) (4.27) (3.79) (4.16) (3.67) (6.75)
Volatility of cash flow growth
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High
dCF 2.1% 1.9% 1.9% 2.1% 1.5% 1.8% 2.3% 2.8% 3.2% 4.7%
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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firm’s cash flow sensitivity to aggregate shocks is increasing with operating lease-
induced operating leverage. At the same time, firms with high lease ratios have greater
cash flow growth volatility. The bottom panel of Table 12 reports the decile portfolios’
standard deviations in annual average cash flow growth. Table 3 also shows that those
firms with high levels of operating leases have more volatile returns. Except for the first
decile, the standard deviations of portfolio returns increase with the lease ratio. Tuzel
(2010) supports this finding; firms with high levels of operating leases have much more
volatile returns than firms that do not have a significant amount of operating leases.
2.10 Persistency of the lease ratio
I am also interested in whether the level of operating leases is a firm characteristic that
shows persistence in the short run. I expect that the firm’s fraction of leased capital
changes over time depending on the firm’s lifecycle. However, the probability of a firm
moving from a particular decile to other deciles in the succeeding year should not be high
since leased capital is difficult to adjust in the short run. Following Imrohoroglu and
Tuzel (2014), Table 13 presents the transition probability matrix for the firms in the
study’s sample sorted into lease ratio decile portfolios. The probability of staying in the
lowest lease ratio portfolio is 61%, whereas the probability of staying in the highest lease
ratio portfolio is 68%. The higher probabilities along the diagonal show some persistency
in the ratio of operating leases. The drop-off probabilities in Table 13 shows the
probability that a firm in a given lease ratio portfolio will disappear from the sample in
the succeeding year. The reasons for drop-off can be either firm failure or a missing data
item in the succeeding year. The probability of drop-off is higher for firms in the highest
lease ratio portfolio. Except for the first decile, the drop-off rate increases monotonically.
Therefore, I interpret the higher drop-off rates of high-lease ratio firms as indicating a
higher probability of failure.
2.11 December fiscal year end requirement
In the calculation of expected returns, CRSP stock return data from July of year tþ1 to
June of year t þ 2 is matched with accounting information for the fiscal year ending in
year t, as in Fama and French (1992, 1993). This 6-month gap between the accounting
information and returns guarantees that the accounting information is already
impounded into the stock prices. To ensure that the accounting data are not outdated
by the time of the sorting procedure, my sample includes only firms with a fiscal year
ending in December. However, the results are very similar if I drop this December fiscal
year-end restriction. Tables 14 to 16 reproduce the main results (Tables 1 and 2 for
descriptive statistics and Table 3 for excess returns) based on the entire cross-section of
firms that report theirMRC1 in the Compustat/CRSPmerged database. The annual return
spread for the equal-weighted portfolios is 8.4% and the corresponding spread for the
value-weighted portfolios is 5.2%.
3 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence about the link between a firm’s level of non-
cancellable operating lease commitments and expected stock returns, offering an
economic explanation as to how firm characteristics can predict returns. The
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interpretation of the return differences of the lease ratio portfolios is that firms that have
higher levels of operating leases also have higher operating leverage, and consequently
are riskier than firms with lower levels of operating leases. Such firms with high levels of
non-cancellable operating leases are particularly risky in recessionary periods.
There are several dimensions of operating leases that my simple lease ratio ignores
here. For example, the nature of the lease contract, the maturity structure and restrictions
on how the asset can be deployed or utilised (Tuzel, 2010) could affect the flexibility of
the lease commitments. Currently, the FASB and IASB are working on a converged
accounting standard for firms’ leasing activities. When these regulatory bodies
implement the new accounting rule on leases, future work in this area will provide a
better picture of a firm’s operating lease activities in the financial statements.
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